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## **FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA) AND THE NEW C<sup>2</sup>: COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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**04 May 2011**

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## Abstract

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) continues to gain prominence as a primary mission area across the DoD. Both US military and civilian leadership acknowledge that FHA has emerged as a growth industry which has the potential to enhance our global position through critical partnership and engagement with key strategic allies in their hour of greatest need. Because FHA operations reside at the nexus of Civilian and Military (CIVMIL) cooperation, they force operational commanders to fuse multiple instruments of national power towards achieving mission success. Achieving proper alignment and synchronization among these various entities creates significant challenges which traditional precepts of Command and Control ( $C^2$ ) are ill-equipped to overcome. Given the unique attributes of this complex mission area and the resulting challenges it poses, traditional US Military paradigms of Command and Control need to be revised, necessitating a renewed approach that emphasizes Coordination and Collaboration (“The New  $C^2$ ”) towards enhancing mission effectiveness and unity of effort among a diverse set of military and non-military stakeholders. This paper reviews traditional paradigms of Command and Control and considers their inadequacy when applied to FHA missions, drawing upon recent US experience in foreign disaster response missions in Haiti and Pakistan to demonstrate the efficacy of the new  $C^2$ . The paper concludes with several recommendations for operational commanders to consider whereby the tenets of the new  $C^2$  can be better incorporated into FHA planning and execution, thereby facilitating unity of effort in a situation where unity of command is simply infeasible.

*“What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”<sup>1</sup>*

General J.M. Shalikashvili  
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

## **Introduction**

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) continues to gain prominence as a primary mission area across the DoD. To wit, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) listed Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) as one of the Navy’s six primary capabilities that, together, “comprise the core of US maritime power.”<sup>2</sup> Additionally, the images of the US Military, Department of State (DOS) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) acting in concert to render timely humanitarian relief and disaster assistance to devastated populations sends a powerful and poignant strategic message to the rest of the world that demonstrates both the efficacy and benevolence of US global leadership.

Because FHA operations reside at the nexus of Civilian and Military (CIVMIL) cooperation, they force operational commanders to fuse multiple instruments of national power towards achieving mission success. Achieving proper alignment and synchronization among the various participating organizations creates significant challenges which traditional precepts of Command and Control (C<sup>2</sup>) are ill-equipped to overcome. The resulting friction carries the very real potential to hinder our operational effectiveness and compromise key strategic relationships. Given the unique attributes of this complex mission area and the resulting challenges it poses, traditional US Military paradigms of Command and Control need to be revised, necessitating a renewed approach that emphasizes Coordination and Collaboration (“The New C<sup>2</sup>”) towards enhancing mission effectiveness and unity of effort among a diverse set of military and non-military stakeholders.

## Traditional Paradigms of Command and Control

Among members of the Armed Services, the term “Command and Control” tends to evoke mental images of complex wire diagrams, and static organization charts. Terms such as “Supported and Supporting Commander”, “TACON”, and “OPCON” form the core of this military-centric vocabulary, which is largely misunderstood by those not affiliated with DoD.

Joint Pub 1-02 (JP 1-02) defines “Command and Control” as the following:

“The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission...Also called C<sup>2</sup>.”<sup>3</sup>

As the above definition illustrates, the function of Command and Control doctrinally applies exclusively to a Commander’s assigned military forces. If we analyze the terms separately, the narrow applicability of this function becomes even more glaringly obvious and its lack of suitability to FHA operations increasingly clear. Joint Pub 1-02 describes “Command” as:

“Central to all military action.” It further states that, “Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion.”<sup>4</sup>

Moving on, JP 1-02 defines “Control” as:

“Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as directed.”<sup>5</sup>

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the terms “Command” and “Control”, when taken together, focus quite narrowly on a military organization and a Commander’s ability to direct its activities towards successful mission accomplishment. There is also an implicit organizational hierarchy contained in “Command and Control” as well.

No aspect of “Command and Control” translates into the effective performance of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance operations. Functionally, it ignores the fundamental reality of a

multi-pronged response effort involving numerous non-military actors and agencies upon whose full cooperation and participation our ultimate success will hinge. In such a multi-lateral response framework, the over-arching organizational goal of delivering life-saving aid to millions of devastated, dispersed, and isolated citizens has much more to do with coordination as opposed to command, and our efficiency/effectiveness depends largely on our ability to collaborate amongst all stakeholders as opposed to controlling the broader effort. To suggest that the JTF Commander, as a supporting element, can exercise any type of “command” over such a diverse organization is tantamount to ignorance, and to imply that he/she has the ability to “control” any aspect of the situation – to include the dynamic conditions of the FHA environment or the specific actions of the multitude of responders involved – is to indulge in unadulterated fantasy. Simply stated, we need a revised paradigm, and “the new C<sup>2</sup>” – coordination and collaboration – satisfies this requirement while acknowledging the inherent shortfalls of traditional applications of Command and Control.

### **The New C<sup>2</sup>: Coordination and Collaboration**

In the context of FHA, command is not the main issue. CNA Analyst Karen Smith supports this assertion in her paper, “Command and Coordination in HAO.”<sup>6</sup> Nor is command the key enabler to our effectiveness as a joint military force with the objective of saving lives, easing human suffering, and providing relief for a devastated population in the aftermath of a terrible natural disaster. Rather, the principal requirement in FHA is effective coordination, and by extension, collaboration with the broad spectrum of actors involved.

As Chris Seiple points out in his paper entitled, “The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Intervention:”

“In order for the NGO/Military relationship to work, there must be an exchange of services: the relationship must be mutually beneficial... Otherwise, each acts as if the other did not exist: NGO’s pursuing exclusively humanitarian purposes

and the military providing its own solution according to its self-contained infrastructure.”<sup>7</sup>

Each of the organizations involved in an FHA operation invariably contains their own respective chain of command and organizational hierarchy. They have different charters and are bound by a different set of constraints and policy directives that the US military’s traditional command and control structure cannot begin to integrate, let alone unify. Combined with the fact that the Joint Force Commander is always tasked as a “supporting” element to the US Lead Federal Agency (typically USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance/OFDA), the case for adopting the new C<sup>2</sup> is significantly strengthened.

Consistent with Seiple’s above-referenced observations, the new C<sup>2</sup> emphasizes the primacy of the relationships that must be constantly engendered and reinforced among the diverse network of responders, to include the host nation, in order to achieve success. It also provides mechanisms to resolve issues of accountability that become increasingly complicated outside the realm of a purely military operation, and promotes greater flexibility and transparency when dealing with the challenges posed by a potentially uncertain FHA environment on sovereign foreign territory. Most importantly, however, the new C<sup>2</sup> facilitates unity of effort in a situation where unity of command is simply not attainable. Recent FHA experience bears this out.

### **Operation Unified Response: A Textbook Illustration of The New C<sup>2</sup> in Action**

In January 2010, a massive 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck the island nation of Haiti. The devastation killed an estimated 230,000 people and left over 2 million without shelter.<sup>8</sup> Damage to infrastructure was incalculable and reconstruction efforts continue to the present day. As the appointed Commander of Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H), Lieutenant General Ken Keen, USA, was faced with the massive task of leading the US Military response in



support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), USAID. In addition to over 20,000 US service members, LTG Keen also had to integrate over 9,000 UN troops and synchronize the activities of the JTF with over 1,000 NGO's, IGO's, and PVO's on the ground<sup>9</sup>. This proved to be an extreme challenge which traditional paradigms of C<sup>2</sup> were unable to reconcile.

Reflecting upon how JTF-H bridged the gap of language, culture, function, and public-to-private sector cooperation, LTG Keen was very direct in citing that; “we did it with coordination and collaboration, the ‘new C<sup>2</sup>’.”<sup>10</sup> LTG Keen expounded upon this observation further; “What we have found is that our success as a comprehensive body – the Government of Haiti, U.S. Embassy, UN, USAID, JTF-H and NGOs – is primarily tied to our ability to coordinate and collaborate.”<sup>11</sup>

One of the methods employed to achieve coordination and collaboration at JTF-H was the robust application of Social Networking. Tools such as Facebook (with over 5,000 followers), and Twitter (with over 270 followers) facilitated the repaid dissemination of real-time disaster relief information.<sup>12</sup> Another method employed by JTF-H was the utilization of the All Partners Access Network (APAN).<sup>13</sup> This tool allowed JTF-H to integrate web-based collaborative capabilities to increase operational transparency, cross-level information, and enhance situational awareness across the diverse spectrum of responders both on-scene and across the globe. This innovative and scalable network approach facilitated forum discussions that promoted more efficient humanitarian resource allocation as well as providing a streamlined process for distributing and responding to time-sensitive Requests for Information (RFI's) that originated outside the purview of normal military channels. The All Partners Access Network yielded an unqualified success story that will undoubtedly enhance coordination and collaboration in complex FHA environments in the future.

In addition to Social Networking tools, JTF-H also implemented other collaborative measures to enhance FHA coordination. In order to more effectively manage airfield operations at Toussaint Louverture Int'l Airport, the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center (HFOCC) was established and designated as a provisional coalition organization, allowing JTF-H to coordinate with outside organizations such as USAID, the UN, DOS, World Food Programme, and the Haitian Government. As LtCol Stephen Davidson and Maj David Smith, USAF, point out, "Military-centric tools were thrown out and new ones were invented."<sup>14</sup> The increased coordination and collaboration that the HFOCC was able to achieve resulted in greater ramp efficiency which translated into a 500% increase in the number of daily aircraft arrivals and the movement of over 18,000 short tons of HA supplies, the safe landing of 3,940 international flights, and the transport of 29,000 passengers. These numbers exceeded Hurricane Katrina totals.<sup>15</sup>

Another mechanism employed by JTF-H to achieve greater coordination and collaboration was the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC). Joint Pub 3-29 defines the HACC as "a temporary center established by a geographic combatant commander to assist with interagency coordination and planning."<sup>16</sup> The HACC is a critical element in providing essential interface and linkage among the JTF, IGO's, and NGO's, particularly in the early stages of a complex FHA mission. Its reach extends beyond traditional C<sup>2</sup>. Rather than a span of *control*, the HACC – if properly implemented – can provide the JTF Commander with a greater span of *influence* which can enable more efficient and effective employment of the Joint Force's military capabilities. As LTG Keen observed, "The one organization that served as the conduit for bringing all the different organizations and functions under one 'C<sup>2</sup> roof' was the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center or

HACC.”<sup>17</sup> The HACC facilitates deliberate multi-organizational planning and proactive synchronization of activities. It also provides a constructive forum for FHA leadership to collaborate on matters of importance at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, eliminating the hindrance of traditional C<sup>2</sup> barriers and optimizing relief efforts. As Keen et al point out in their paper, “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations”,

“Coordination and collaboration was critical at the operational and tactical levels. For instance, JTF-H did not have command and control of the area of operations, and MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and the JTF both occupied the same tactical terrain. The daily collaboration of unit leaders from the platoon to the brigade level with community leaders, MINUSTAH military forces, and NGOs was key to developing an understanding of the environment, determining requirements, maintaining situational awareness, and supporting the Haitian people.”<sup>18</sup>

These observations serve to illustrate both the inadequacy of traditional C<sup>2</sup> paradigms while highlighting the potential efficacy of the new C<sup>2</sup>. All of these lessons depict the incredible results that can be achieved when operational Commanders think outside of the traditional “C<sup>2</sup> box” and incorporate innovative structural solutions that enhance coordination and collaboration when ill-suited precepts of command and control are neither practical nor operationally feasible.

### **Pakistan Flood Relief 2010**

During late July and early August 2010, extreme monsoon rains devastated the country of Pakistan creating massive floods that covered twenty percent of the country’s land mass, directly affecting over 20 million people. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) requested US assistance, resulting in the delivery of over 26.2 million short tons of HA relief supplies and the rescue/relocation of over 40 thousand internally displaced persons (IDP’s).<sup>19</sup>

Despite the magnitude of the US response effort and the impressive results the Joint Task Force and our Inter-agency partners were able to achieve on behalf of the Government and

citizens of Pakistan, we still encountered significant coordination challenges that transcended traditional paradigms of Command and Control. By applying the tenets of the new C<sup>2</sup> we were able to mitigate (if not overcome) many of these in order to achieve maximum operational effectiveness.

### **The New C2: Breaking Down Barriers in an Uncertain FHA Environment**

As soon as the JTF staff augmentees arrived at Ghazi Airbase in Pakistan's Khyber Paktun Khwa (KpK) province, it was apparent that we, as the US Military, were not calling the "FHA shots." Our every movement had to be carefully vetted through an exhaustingly complex network of both military and political bureaucracy which carried the potential to significantly hinder time-critical FHA efforts. Operational planning was done entirely at the tactical level in close consult with Pakistani Military (PAKMIL) Aviation leadership situated at their 11<sup>th</sup> Corps Headquarters in Peshawar. Freedom of maneuver was, essentially, non-existent, and our robust FHA capabilities were at the mercy of a disjointed Pakistani command structure who considered the preservation of its image as a functional military organization its primary strategic objective.

Given these circumstances, it was clear to all involved that any FHA results we might achieve would be entirely dependant upon exhaustive coordination and collaboration with PAKMIL leadership. As Spencer Ackerman observed; "The Pakistani military in particular is walking a very thin line. They do not want to take responsibility for this fiasco, nor be seen as overridden by American demands and further dependant on a country that a lot of their people hate."<sup>20</sup>

BG Michael Nagata, USA, Deputy Commander of the Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan (ODR-P) and Commander of the Aviation Task Force-North at

Ghazi, spoke directly to this issue in his oft-repeated Commander's Guidance the day the 15<sup>th</sup> MEU arrived in-country;

“The relationship we maintain with the Pakistani Military will enable our effectiveness. Nothing in the vast capabilities we bring to this disaster will make any difference if the relationship is not carefully maintained. We must keep in lock-step with PAKMIL and go only as fast as they will allow us to go.”<sup>21</sup>

In such an environment, traditional precepts of Command and Control do not even begin to reconcile the enormity of the C<sup>2</sup> challenge we face. In fact, it even goes far beyond the more manageable difficulty of simply integrating the participation of NGO's, IGO's, and PVO's that I have already discussed. Unlike in Haiti, we now had to develop an effective coordination mechanism with the Host Nation military establishment that would enable our FHA success. Ackerman draws the following comparison;

“...there's at least one huge exogenous difference between the US's ability to help Haiti and Pakistan; sovereignty. In Haiti, the beleaguered and overwhelmed government had no problem accepting help from its nearby American neighbor. Not so in Pakistan. In Haiti, we took over the landing strips. We took over completely the provision of assistance.”<sup>22</sup>

Thus, our FHA mission in Pakistan hinged on our ability to adapt and integrate a new paradigm of C<sup>2</sup>. The relatively small aviation footprint we established in Ghazi did not suffer from a lack of command and control. In fact, that functional aspect of the mission was relatively simple to resolve. The larger, and more critical, challenge centered around our effort to coordinate operational decision-making and achieve unity of effort with a foreign military who would constrain our every movement and dictate every facet of the FHA mission.

Compounding these challenges was the fact that we were executing an FHA mission in a highly uncertain security environment. Some would even describe it as non-permissive. Thus, we relied heavily on the Pakistani Military to establish security perimeters at the

evacuation and aid distribution sites, as well as to screen IDP's to ensure we weren't placing potential insurgents on US aircraft. As BG Nagata observed, "What made my mission in the North much more complex was the fact that we were trying to conduct HA/DR in a conflict-affected area. That meant that the Host Nation had to spend as much of its energy providing our security as it did on partnering with us on actual HA/DR activities."<sup>23</sup>

Resolving these immense challenges and unleashing our FHA capability was not about Command and Control. It was about fostering relationships with the PAKMIL and finding efficient methods by which to coordinate objectives that were typically not aligned with each other. The vigorous application of the new C<sup>2</sup>, Coordination and Collaboration, were the key enablers to solving this dilemma.

### **The New C2 and the Primacy of the Relationship**

Inherent in The New C<sup>2</sup> is a greater emphasis on the relationships we must foster outside traditional military channels in order to be effective – especially in the context of FHA. As BG Nagata observes; "When I went to Ghazi, I already had personal relationships with every GO (General Officer) I had to interface with on a daily basis. We'd already drunk tea together, we'd already gotten acquainted."<sup>24</sup>

A likely question or response to this observation might be, "How do we mandate this? *Can* we mandate this?" Truthfully, we probably can't. However, institutionalizing a greater appreciation for the tenets of the new C<sup>2</sup> certainly carries the potential to promote increased awareness for the primacy of external relationships and how these can be leveraged to enhance operational effectiveness that hinges less upon our own force capabilities and more upon robust relationships with a Host Nation and the cooperation of its military establishment.

## **Counter Arguments**

Many doctrinal purists will undoubtedly chafe at the mere suggestion that C<sup>2</sup> is anything less than THE single most important function in a military operation. The Marine Corps Doctrine Publication Six (MCDP-6) states very clearly that “no single activity in war is more important than Command and Control.”<sup>25</sup> However, that mindset is fundamentally flawed when one honestly confronts the unique attributes of FHA and acknowledges the fact that the mission itself is inherently non-military in nature.

## **The Supported/Supporting Conundrum**

The basic reality of FHA is that we, as a military, will never be executing the operation in unilateral fashion. There will always be a significant NGO, PVO, and inter-agency component to our response framework. Though the JTF may be designated by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) as the supported commander, the task force will always be acting in a supporting role to the broader US effort. In this construct, FHA represents a hybrid response, and Command and Control is simply not the key function that enables overall success. LTG Keen, JTF-Haiti Commander, plainly acknowledged this in his observations following Operation Unified Response.

“Now I know there are some purists, who will read this blog and say, “No, C<sup>2</sup> stands for command and control, not coordinate and collaborate.” But what I found was that command and control, though very important, was not the critical element in achieving the objective in this humanitarian assistance mission.”<sup>26</sup>

In a purely military operation, I concede that Command and Control is a critical enabler of our success as a joint force. At the operational level, it aligns and prioritizes resources and assets relative to the military objective, brokers decision-making responsibility among the service components, and promotes unity of effort among the participating forces. However, the reality of FHA renders these aims essentially moot when one considers that our objective

is not military in nature, decision-making is done in a collaborative environment amongst a broad consortium of non-military stakeholders, and unity of effort is achieved not via clearly-articulated command relationships but through constant coordination with those elements who bear no reporting relationship or requirement to the appointed JTF Commander. The host nation, in conjunction with DoS, tell us where we can operate, when we can operate there, and what we are allowed to do once we arrive on-scene. In such an environment, I struggle to find the relevancy of Command and Control when, in the final analysis, neither enables our ultimate effectiveness, and clinging to this paradigm will only serve to alienate those organizations upon whom we are relying upon to achieve a brand of success that can not be defined in military terms. Further illuminating this fact, one LNO from CTF-70 serving in an advisory role following the recent earthquake in Northern Japan (Operation Tomodachi) commented,

“We again leapt to try and jam the square peg of our known and loved C<sup>2</sup> (top-down hierarchy) into the very round hole of what HA/DR requires – a flat organization that emphasizes speed, flexibility, and partnership.”<sup>27</sup>

Admiral Mike Mullen, sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently spoke tangentially to this issue as well when he observed that:

“How we lead will be as important as the military capabilities we provide... and in leading, our military must be ready to play a number of roles - facilitator, enabler, convener and guarantor -- sometimes simultaneously...the emerging security environment calls for more extensive and broader security partnerships "within government, between public and private, and most importantly, internationally...”<sup>28</sup>

Rear Admiral Sinclair Harris, former Commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 5 and one of the JTF Commanders in (Southern) Pakistan during the 2010 Pakistani Flood Relief effort, echoed the Chairman’s sentiments: “The Chairman articulates what you mean by the new C<sup>2</sup> when he says US military leaders will need to be prepared to be, ‘...facilitator, enabler,



convener and guarantor...’ It is all about collaboration and coordination vice command and control when working in the new security environment.”<sup>29</sup>

### **Linking Joint Doctrine to FHA Execution**

Additionally, there are likely some who may contend that existing Joint Doctrine adequately addresses the need to adopt a broader, more holistic C<sup>2</sup> approach in the execution of FHA operations. I do not dispute this. Joint Pub 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, specifically mentions the need to aggressively “coordinate and collaborate”, and acknowledges the critical requirement for Commanders to integrate the activities of the Joint Task Force with those of external organizations:

“Because of the number of civilian and non-USG actors involved in a crisis, command relationships outside DOD command structures may not be clearly defined and success will depend heavily on effective, timely coordination... US military FHA planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies fall outside the military C<sup>2</sup> system.”<sup>30</sup>

JP 3-29 goes on to highlight the significance of the HACC and CMOC and advocates strongly on behalf of their potential value in achieving greater coordination and unity of effort.

Unfortunately, as is often the case, there appears to be a significant disconnect between theory and execution as it pertains to Joint Doctrine and the actual conduct of FHA. Review of several C<sup>2</sup> diagrams and JTF Organization Charts from recent FHA missions reveals no inclusion of or reference to elements such as a HACC or CMOC. Those that do reference one of these structures appear to do so in ad-hoc fashion and the placement of the CMOC creates some ambiguity regarding where it fits amongst the broader FHA network and how its efforts are integrated and coordinated with the larger humanitarian response effort.

Additionally, a review of the Operational Orders related to recent FHA operations

(PLANORDS, WARNORDS, EXORDS, FRAGORDS, etc.) contain no specified tasks directing the establishment of a CMOC or HACC, casting significant doubt concerning how prominent certain GCC's and JTF Commanders view their role in effective FHA performance. In the absence of direct tasking, it is fair to conclude that the establishment of a CMOC or HACC will largely entail an ad-hoc, poorly organized effort that will undermine our ability as a Joint Task Force to coordinate and collaborate with the vast network of FHA supporters we will need to work through. Of course, simply directing the establishment of a CMOC or HACC is not likely to resolve all coordination issues that may arise, as there are often significant complications on where to physically locate the organization and how to properly staff it. Given that JTF Commanders are likely to find themselves in largely uncharted territory in this realm, it may be useful to create more instructive guidance/doctrine on how to properly construct and implement this element to ensure its maximum benefit is extracted.

## **Recommendations**

First and foremost, the establishment of a HACC, and subsequently, a CMOC, needs to be included in HHQ Orders as a specified task to the subordinate JTF Commander. It is an essential structural element that needs to be formally codified in the Operational Order. Request for Forces (RFF's) should reflect their staffing requirements and C<sup>2</sup> outlines should include their emplacement while clearly establishing their reporting relationships/requirements. By taking this relatively simple step, we can more effectively link existing Joint Doctrine with actual FHA performance. The HACC and CMOC have been referenced in various iterations of Joint and Service-specific Doctrine since the mid 1990's, yet anecdotal evidence suggests that very few within DoD seem to express an appreciation

either for their formal establishment during an FHA mission or their potential utility - to say nothing of the critical roles they perform. The HACC and CMOC, as our recent FHA experience in Haiti demonstrated, significantly enhance our ability to coordinate and collaborate among the broad spectrum of responders involved and, if properly implemented, can significantly help towards achieving unity of effort.

Building upon this recommendation, the JTF Commander should be tasked to formally develop and articulate his/her plan for achieving coordination and collaboration across the FHA enterprise, specifically addressing how they will achieve integration with the NGO community and Host Nation. This requirement will act as a forcing function as the Operational Commander must now deliberately anticipate and resolve the unique challenges of how they will structure the force for success within a non-military response framework. Additionally, Liaison Officers from the JTF need to be permanently embedded within the USAID Clusters. Too often, these assignments are made in ad-hoc fashion with inconsistent levels of military participation, thus limiting the degree of coordination that is achieved with the NGO and PVO community. The clusters typically have the most direct tie-in with the host nation disaster management authorities, as well as the Embassy Country Team. They also possess the greatest level of familiarity with the terrain and any FHA-related constraints it may impose. Having a constant, embedded staff Liaison will better inform the JTF's FHA planning efforts, increase transparency in terms of where the greatest humanitarian need(s) exists and where the focus of effort should reside, and enhance unity of effort/synchronization with non-military responders.

Also, there is an obvious need to better educate military professionals on the roles and functions of USAID/OFDA and how they, as the LFA in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,

operate in a wide-scale disaster response scenario. Gaining a deeper understanding and appreciation for this organization will help break down organizational barriers, promote greater partnership and collaboration, and build relationship currency that can be leveraged quickly in response to an FHA mission. Towards this end, USAID developed the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) to enhance the military's awareness of their role in providing humanitarian assistance. The JHOC needs to be aggressively exported to as many GCC's and Service Component Commands as feasible to facilitate mutual understanding and promote relationship building at the operational level. Doing so will reduce the time required for the Joint Force Commander and his FHA team to get on-step, and will also help to better align expectations between the JTF and the LFA, thus minimizing potential friction that could ultimately hinder FHA effectiveness.

Lastly, given the prominent role that relationships with the Host Nation and its military forces play in the context of FHA, GCC's must place greater institutional emphasis on the need for subordinate Commanders (be they Defense Attaches, Service Component Commanders, or JTF-Crisis Response Commanders) to develop close partnerships with key military leadership in their respective AOR's. To date, this type of relationship-building and partnership is being done through the personal, anticipatory initiative of FO/GO's. As BG Nagata observes;

“What's missing is this ‘personal initiative’ being institutionalized as a Mission Priority. But it will require COCOM's and Services to prioritize ‘Personal Relationships’ as a critical battlefield operating system...which today it is not.”<sup>31</sup>

The fact is, history equips us with a relatively accurate sense of where many of these Natural Disasters will likely strike. Both USG and DoD need to formally prioritize the requirement for senior leaders from both military and civilian agencies that are most likely to deploy to these regions in a crisis response role to have built personal relationships with the military

and civilian interlocutors in those countries. It should be treated as an operational imperative, specifically included in Theater Campaign Plans, and enforced with purpose and vigor. The potential dividends, as we saw in Pakistan, are huge.

## **Conclusion**

Experts predict that Natural Disasters will continue to occur across the globe with increased frequency in the future. Our singular ability to effectively respond to these crises will continue to be tested in new ways, and applying military-centric solutions to the challenge of achieving unity of effort will not enable our success. They will, in fact, be a hindrance. The new C<sup>2</sup> is a critical framework that will help Joint Commanders better shape the FHA response effort and enhance our overall effectiveness. It will facilitate partnerships, promote transparency through mutual trust and understanding, and achieve greater balance of effort across a diverse network of FHA responders, each of whom plays a pivotal role in the context of the broader mission. As our military leadership continues to emphasize, “Trust and cooperation can not surge.”<sup>32</sup> The new C<sup>2</sup> is one method that can help to address this dilemma.

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